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Nuno Venturinha’s book, Descriptions of Situations, provides a concise, but remarkably 
wide-ranging account of language and thought from what can be called a practice-based 
perspective. This type of perspective takes as its starting point the situated study of our 
discursive practices in particular contexts. One of the main challenges faced by such an 
approach, as I see it, is to show how our practices can come to be governed by objective 
standards, that is standards that go beyond the evaluative stances of the participants in the 
practice.  
 This challenge is especially pressing in relation to moral practices, the topic of the 
last chapter of Venturinha’s book. Our epistemic practices concerning empirical issues 
involve perception and practical interactions with our surroundings, which arguably 
introduce sufficient friction with the world for objective standards to arise. It is not 
obvious what could play an analogous role to perception in the case of moral thought (one 
can perhaps argue that moral intuitions bring us into contact with objective, mind-
independent moral facts, but this is surely a controversial idea). Not surprisingly, 
therefore, it has been common in the literature to endorse some form of non-objectivism 
about our moral practices. Instances of such non-objectivism can be found in different 
versions of moral emotivism, relativism, expressivism and constructivism (see, among 
many others, Ayer 1936/1971; Stevenson 1944; Hartman 1975; Blackburn 1984, 1993; 
Gibbard 1992; Street 2010). 
 In this note, my goal is to discuss akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated 
form of moral subjectivism that, I think, can be derived from Venturinha’s remarks on 
moral matters. In order to do so, I start by examining Venturinha’s Disclosure Principle 
and the type of subjectivism it leads to. Then I critically discuss Venturinha’s epistemic 
account of akrasia and I propose what I take to be a better alternative view, based on the 
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Disclosure Principle. According to this proposal, in an akratic subject there is a conflict 
between the motivational dispositions she currently has, as the person she is now, and the 
motivational dispositions that the person she aspires to be would have.  
 
 
1 The Ethical and the Subjective 
 
At first sight, it could seem that Venturinha embraces a purely subjectivist view of moral 
practices, or at least of what he calls the ethical. Indeed, he starts the chapter 
distinguishing between “morality”, understood as the social norms mandatory in a 
community, and “ethics”, which is related to the pursuit of the good and has to do with 
an inner space of intimacy and a first-person stance: “Ethics, one could say, is my own 
business; morality is communitarian” (Venturinha 2018: 90). However, it soon becomes 
apparent that what Venturinha calls the ethical incorporates an inter-subjective 
dimension. Ethics is after all communitarian at root.    
The inter-subjective nature of the ethical is reflected in Venturinha’s Disclosure 
Principle (2018: 91). According to this principle, one should act as if one’s actions were 
being observed and assessed by people one cares for: “imagine that whatever you do, 
even the things that only you know about, can be seen and would be seen by those you 
most care for” (Venturinha 2018: 91). Clearly, the Disclosure Principle is implausible as 
a principle determining what is (ethically) right: it is too dependent on contingent issues 
about who those you care for are and what moral sensibilities and judging dispositions 
they actually have. For instance, it could happen that you care very much for your loved 
ones despite knowing that they have terrible ethical views. It could even be the case that 
you know that you tend to behave badly when you are observed by your loved ones 
(perhaps because you feel under pressure to conform to their terrible ethical views).   
However, I do not think that we are supposed to understand the Disclosure 
Principle in this strong (and implausible) way. The principle should rather be taken to 
provide a fallible heuristic guide for figuring out what the right thing to do is. Seen under 
this light, the principle becomes more attractive. Moreover, the Disclosure Principle 
points to a  way of avoiding extreme subjectivism, by introducing a wedge between the 
subject’s desires and what is actually ethically right. The principle makes room for the 
possibility that the subject desires to do something that is actually wrong, since what she 
desires can be at odds with what those she cares for would approve of.  
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In this way, I propose reading the Disclosure Principle as underlain by a response-
dependent account of ethical goodness and rightness (Wiggins 1987; Lewis 1989; 
Wegwood 1997; McDowell 1998). The idea behind the principle would be that ethically 
right actions are those that would be approved of by judges that the subject considers 
creditable or worth listening to. In other words, the good would be what the subject 
considers to be worthy of being valued—and right actions would be those actions that the 
subject considers that deserve being approved of. This version of the principle comes 
close to a fitting-attitudes view of value, according to which being of value amounts to 
being the fitting object of valuing attitudes like approval (see Wiggins 1987; McDowell 
1998; Scanlon 1998). However, note that the principle I am gesturing towards stops short 
of being a fully-fledged fitting-attitudes account, given that what is ethically good would 
be determined by those evaluative responses that the subject considers to be fitting, rather 
than by the responses that are actually fitting.  
To be sure, we could take one further step and claim that ethically good actions 
are those that are the object of fitting attitudes of approval. But I am not sure whether 
Venturinha is willing to go this far. As I see it, a view that is closer to the spirit of 
Venturinha’s Disclosure Principle is David Lewis’ proposal that what is good is what the 
subject desires to desire (Lewis 1989). Plausibly, in general we will desire to have those 
desires and evaluative attitudes that we consider fitting or appropriate, that is the 
evaluative attitudes that those who we take to be admirable ethical judges are disposed to 
have. As pointed out above, this type of view goes beyond a crude form of ethical 
subjectivism, insofar as it allows for ethical evaluation to take some distance from the 
subject’s immediate first-order desires and evaluative attitudes. Granted, the view is not 
fully objectivist, since it does not distinguish between what is fitting to value or desire 
and what the subject desires to value or desire. But perhaps full objectivity is not to be 
had in the ethical realm. At any rate, I think that the Disclosure Principle does not (and is 
not expected to) secure robust ethical objectivity, but just a moderate form of (inter-
)subjectivism.   
 
 
2 Akrasia as an Epistemic Problem 
 
Although the Disclosure Principle may offer some guide in ethical deliberations, it does 
not seem that Venturinha thinks that it always provides conclusive answers about what to 
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do on particular occasions. Indeed, Venturinha suggests that ethical uncertainty is 
widespread: it is often difficult to figure out exactly what one ought to do in a certain 
situation (2018: 93). The reason for this is that, according to Venturinha, ethical 
deliberation is highly context-sensitive. From this particularist conception of ethics, 
Venturinha draws the sceptical conclusion that ethical knowledge is typically not 
forthcoming: “Again, there can be no such thing as moral knowledge. The positive and 
negative poles of the ethical experience simply indicate a momentary state of 
consciousness that is context-sensitive.” (2018: 93) 
Venturinha derives an interesting epistemic account of akrasia from his ethical 
scepticism. Akrasia is said by Venturinha to take place when the subject chooses “to do 
what she judges to be wrong instead of what she judges to be right” (2018: 92). However, 
in Venturinha’s view, akrasia is actually the result of ethical uncertainty. When a subject 
does w rather than what she judges she ought to do, r, it is because she does not really 
know for sure whether doing r is better than doing w:  
 
She does w for the simple reason that she is not absolutely sure about the value of r. She may be 
more inclined to believe that doing r is better than doing w, but she does not know it. In fact, no 
one can ever claim to know something in this realm. (Venturinha 2018: 92) 
 
One first issue with this proposal is that it does not address genuine cases of ethical 
akrasia. Plausibly, if the subject is aware that she does not know whether r is better than 
w, she should not judge that this is so. It can be argued that a subject is not in a position 
to have a rational full belief that p (i.e. to judge that p) if she knows that she is not in a 
position to know that p.1 More specifically, if the subject is aware that her (rational) 
doubts prevent her from knowing for sure whether she ought to do r (or rather w), then 
she is not in a position to rationally judge, or fully believe, that she ought to do r. I take 
it that the interesting cases of akrasia are those where the agent knows (or at least, 
rationally believes) that she ought to do r, but nevertheless chooses to do w. This form of 
akrasia would remain unexplained by Venturinha’s epistemic account. Rather, 
Venturinha’s proposal seems to concern subjects that have to decide what to do in 
circumstances of pervasive uncertainty, without being sure whether they are actually 
 
1 Note that this requirement is weaker than a knowledge norm for belief like Williamson’s (2000), according 
to which one may believe to p only if she knows it. 
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making the right decision. This type of ethical deliberation under uncertainty is surely 
worth exploring, but I do not think that it involves straightforward cases of akrasia.   
Moreover, I think that generalized ethical scepticism can be resisted, even if one 
is sympathetic to the idea that ethical deliberation is context-sensitive. It is not clear to 
me that ethical particularism leads to the sceptical view that subjects cannot typically 
know, on a given occasion, what is the right thing to do. Particularism is committed to 
the claim that there are no general, universal, non-trivial rules that determine what is 
ethically right in each possible case (see, for instance, Dancy 2004). But this commitment 
is compatible with thinking that subjects are often be able to come to know what they 
ought to do on a particular occasion, after taking into account all relevant contextual 
information. Particularists can argue that such knowledge is not attained by applying 
general rules, but rather by manifesting a suitable ethical sensibility, or by being properly 
responsive to the reasons available in that particular situation. For example, a particularist 
may deny that there is a general ethical rule that decisively forbids lying in any possible 
situation, while at the same time acknowledging that, on a give specific case, it is ethically 
forbidden for a certain subject to lie. Surely, there are many contexts where we can know 
that it is wrong to enslave children!  
  
 
3 Akrasia and the Disclosure Principle   
 
A better picture of akrasia can be provided, I think, if we combine the Disclosure Principle 
with the idea that akratic subjects are conflicted or divided. As Venturinha notes (2018: 
92), cases of akrasia involve a conflict of reasons. The subject recognizes the presence of 
conflicting reasons for alternative options. This does not mean, however, that akratic 
situations are ethical dilemmas. The reasons in favour of one of the options (say, w) may 
be recognized by the subject as stronger than the reasons for the other available options 
(say, r). This is why the subject judges that the winning option (w) is the right thing to 
do, i.e. the option supported by the strongest reasons available. Nevertheless, the subject 
will remain aware of the existence of (weaker) reasons for the alternative option r. Such 
weaker reasons will present features of r that make it somewhat good, desirable or worth 
choosing. Akrasia takes place when the subject’s will falls under the attraction of these 
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desirable features of r, even if she recognizes that the alternative option w has other 
features that make it even more desirable.2  
Imagine, for instance, that the subject is deciding whether to go to the cinema or 
to stay home sorting out bills as she promised to her flat mate. The fact that going to the 
cinema will be fun is a reason for the subject to go, whereas the fact that she promised 
her flat mate to sort out the bills is a reason for her to stay home instead. Assume that the 
subject concludes that her reasons to stay home are stronger than her reasons to go to the 
cinema. Still, she will keep being sensitive to the attractiveness of going to the cinema. 
The subject will be akratic if, against her better judgment, she ends up going to the 
cinema, in response to the desirable features of doing so (i.e. it will be a lot of fun!).  
 The Disclosure Principle, as I have interpreted it, offers a nice explanation of how 
this type of akrasia can arise.3 According to my way of fleshing out the principle, right 
actions are those that the subject considers to be fitting objects of attitudes of approval. 
In a Lewisian spirit, let us add a motivational dimension to our judgments about the 
fittingness of evaluative attitudes. Assume then that, when a subject considers that it is 
fitting to approve of a certain action available to her, she desires to approve of it. 
Moreover, assume that, when the subject desires to approve of an action available to her, 
she desires to be motivated to perform it (i.e. she desires to desire to do it).4 The resulting 
view is that right actions are those that the subject desires to desire to perform. Note that, 
on this view, even if judgments about the rightness of an action have motivational force, 
they will not always lead directly to motivation to perform the action judged to be right—
the link between the judgment and motivation to perform the action is often indirect. It 
may happen that the subject is not (yet) able to be motivated to do what she desires to be 
motivated to do. In these cases, judging that a given action is right may fail to directly 
motivate the subject to perform the action, but it will still motivate her to take steps to get 
to a position where she can be actually motivated to perform that action. Imagine, for 
instance, that I judge that I ought to become vegetarian, but I struggle to get myself to do 
it. My judgment that being vegetarian is the right thing to do can nevertheless motivate 
 
2 It is interesting to note that cases of epistemic akrasia seem much more difficult to find (Hurley 1993; 
Pettit and Smith 1996; Adler 2002; Owens 2002; Raz 2011). My suggestion is that this is so because 
epistemic reasons for (full) belief do not conflict with each other, unlike practical reasons: if a subject 
concludes that she has decisive reasons to fully believe that p, then she cannot rationally recognize the 
existence of (weighty) contrary reasons to disbelieve it. See González de Prado (forthcoming).  
3 For further discussion of higher-order desires in connection with akrasia, see for example Mele (1992); 
Pérez Carballo (2018).  
4 For the sake of simplicity, let us stipulate that there is no alternative available action the subject desires to 
approve of.  
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me (at least to some extent) to undertake courses of action that are likely to make me 
more amenable to being directly motivated by the reasons in favour of vegetarianism. For 
instance, I can attend vegetarianism awareness events, or take a closer look at the 
prevalent conditions in animal farming. Hopefully, by undertaking these actions I will 
become a person able to be motivated to become a vegetarian in light of the reasons 
recommending doing so.  
Thus, what is ethically right, from the current perspective of the subject, is not so 
much determined by the evaluative responses and motivational dispositions that she has 
as the person she is now, but rather by the evaluations and dispositions of the person that 
the subject desires to be. As Venturinha puts it, the Disclosure Principle is supposed to 
crystalize “what human beings, in their erratic nature, believe each time to be the best or 
worst picture they want to eternalize of themselves” (2018: 93). 
 Now, it can be difficult to become the person you aspire or desire to be. Often, 
this is not just a matter of an instantaneous, voluntary decision. Many of us are familiar 
with the experience of aiming to become a new person, while still manifesting some of 
the behaviours, dispositions and sensibilities of the old self we desire to leave behind. It 
is not always easy to get rid of character traits and dispositions that you disapprove of and 
wish to modify. Desiring to do something does not always immediately translate into 
achieving it, and, in particular, desires to desire certain things can be hard to satisfy. 
Personal transformation tends to be a lengthy process. 
 I want to suggest that akrasia involves this type of ongoing personal 
transformation and revision. In akratic situations, the subject desires to be a different type 
of person than she currently is—at least, she desires to have different dispositions and 
personality traits. Being the person she still is, the subject cannot properly respond to 
certain reasons yet (for instance, she cannot be moved to refrain from having fun in the 
cinema in order to fulfil her promise to her flat mate). However, the subject recognizes 
the desirability of becoming a person able to respond properly to the relevant reasons, and 
thereby to be motivated to act as those reasons recommend. In this way, the akratic subject 
judges that the right thing to do is to perform an action which a better, desirable self (but 
not her current one) would be motivated to perform.   
 To be sure, akratic subjects described in this manner can still be said to be 
irrational, insofar as they manifest a failure to respond properly to considerations 
recognized by themselves as good reasons in favour of some action (in the example above, 
the akratic subject recognizes that, on balance, her reasons decisively support staying 
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home, and yet she is tempted to go to the cinema instead). After all, it can be argued that 
irrationality is precisely a matter of failing to respond to what from your perspective 
appear to be your reasons (see Schroeder 2007; Way 2009; Parfit 2011; Alvarez 2018; 
González de Prado 2018). Yet, seen under the light of the discussion in the previous 
paragraphs, these irrational akratic individuals are at least intelligible. The challenge 
posed by akrasia is not to show that akratic states can be rational, but rather to explain 
how they can take place in individuals with ordinary psychologies.5  
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